Georgia State University

ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Political Science Faculty Publications

Department of Political Science

1984

The Short-term Consequences of Nuclear War for Civilians
John S. Duffield
Georgia State University, duffield@gsu.edu

Frank von Hippel
Princeton University, fvhippel@princeton.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
John Duffield and Frank von Hippel "The Short-term Consequences of Nuclear War for Civilians," in The
Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, edited by Julius London and Gilbert F. White (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1984): 19-64.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Political Science at
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.

The Environmental
Effects of
Nuclear War
Edited by Julius London
and Gilbert F. White
•I

AAAS Selected Symposium

98

AAAS Selected Symposia Series

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publisher.
Copyright ©

1984 by the American Association for the Advancement of Science

Published in 1984 in the United States of America by
Westview Press, I n c .
5500 Central Avenue
Boulder, Colorado 80301
Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
The Environmental effects of nuclear war.
(A Westview replica edition)
Bibliography: p .
I. Atomic warfare— Environmental aspects. I. London, Julius, 1917—
II. White, Gilbert Fowler, 1911U263.E58 1984
363.3*498
84-19699
ISBN 0-8133-7014-0
Printed and bound in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

John Duffield, Frank von Hippel

2 « The Short-Term
Consequences of Nuclear War
for Civilians
Abstract
Much of the debate over nuclear weapons poli
cy continues to revolve around discussions of the
usefulness of nuclear attacks on military tar
gets. Much less attention, however, is devoted to
either the number or the importance of the ci
vilian casualties that such attacks would cause.
The short-term civilian casualties that would
result from the use of nuclear weapons at three
different levels of "limited nuclear war" are con
sidered.
These levels range from the employment
of neutron bombs during an otherwise "convention
al" battle in the Germanies to a nuclear attack
against the strategic forces of the U.S.
In ad
dition, the consequences of all-out attacks by the
superpowers on each other's cities are briefly
discussed.
It is found that nuclear planners and
strategists have almost always grossly underesti
mated the human costs of the use of nuclear
weapons.
Introduction
It is widely believed that, if one of the
superpowers resorted to the use of nuclear wea
pons, the subsequent exchanges might well escalate
to all-out nuclear war.
It is also widely be
lieved that neither
superpower can hope,
by
attacking the nuclear forces of the other, to el
iminate the possibility of its own destruction.
These beliefs are major deterrents to the use of
nuclear weapons.
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The U.S. defense posture vis a vis the Soviet
Union in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere
is, however, based on another premise:
that the
U.S. is willing, if necessary, to initiate the use
of nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet Union from
crossing certain imaginary lines that have been
drawn around areas the U.S. considers to be of
"vital interest."
In order for this threat of first nuclear use
to be credible to the Soviets, however, it is
first necessary to convince ourselves that the
benefits would outweigh the costs.
This may ex
plain why there is little discussion in the of
ficial literature of the considerations that might
discourage the use of nuclear weapons.
The principal subject of this paper is one of
these neglected areas:
the unintended immediate
casualties among civilians that would result from
the use of nuclear weapons on military targets.
The longer-term effects are discussed in subse
quent chapters.
In these estimates we take ac
count of the likely effects of short-term radi
ation fallout of the type described by Upton in
chapter 5 but we do not consider the long-term
fallout effects on people or on ecosystems as out
lined in chapters 5 and 6.
The casualty figures
discussed in this chapter are therefore on the
very low side, and provide a minimum to which
should be added estimates of the broader environ
mental effects.
We discuss here the civilian fa
talities that would result from the use of nuclear
weapons for several cases that we and others have
analyzed in some depth:
• Battlefield use in the Germanies (East and
West) against conventional forces such as
tanks;
• Use on the "theater" level— also in the
Germanies--against medium- and intermedi
ate-range nuclear weapon systems and nucle
ar warhead storage depots;
• Use against missile silos, bomber bases,
and nuclear naval support facilities in the
U .S .; and
• Use against the cities of the superpowers.
Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons
Any major conflict on the conventional level
between the superpowers would bring with it the
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danger that the losing side would resort to
battlefield nuclear weapons.
In Europe, this
threat of "escalation" is implicit in the deploy
ment of thousands of short-range nuclear warheads
and delivery systems by the NATO and WTO (Warsaw
Treaty Organization) forces.
According to the U.S. Army Field Manual (U.S.
Army, 1982), U.S. battlefield nuclear systems are
designed for use against
• Enemy nuclear delivery systems.
• Key command and control elements.
• Support forces in the rear of committed
elements.
• Follow-on or deep-echeloned forces; and
• Reserves.
Battlefield nuclear systems range from atomic
demolition mines, with explosive yields on the
order of ten tons (0.01 kiloton) TNT equivalent,
to bombs carried by tactical fighter-bombers, with
yields of over one million tons (one megaton) TNT
equivalent.
Between these extremes in both yield
and range are nuclear artillery shells and shortrange
surface-to-surface
ballistic
missiles
(Cochran et a l ., 1983).
The Field Manual also describes how NATO use
of these weapons would be authorized in "pack
ages :"
A package is a group of nuclear weapons of
specific yields for use in a specific area
and within a limited time to support a speci
fic tactical goal. Each package must contain
nuclear weapons sufficient to alter the tact
ical situation decisively and to accomplish
the mission.
The 1976 edition of the Field Manual gives as an
example a package consisting of 2 atomic demo
lition mines (ADM), 30 rounds of nuclear artil
lery, 10 surface-to-surface missiles, and 5 airdelivered bombs (see Fig. 2-1).
Efforts would, of course, be made in planning
and targeting such a set of nuclear warheads to
minimize "collateral damage" to populated areas.
This would be hard to do.
The most-discussed
hypothetical nuclear battlefield in the world in
Europe and the most heavily nuclearized region in
Europe is the two Germanies.
The average popu21

EM PLO YM EN T
Fig. 2-1.

A hypothetical "package" of battlefield nuclear
weapons
being delivered in front of and on the spearhead and follow-up
formations of an attacking ground force.
It includes 2 atomic
demolition mines (ADM), 30 nuclear projectiles fired by artil
lery ("cannon"), 10 warheads delivered by short-range battle
field missiles ("Msl"), and 5 nuclear bombs delivered by air
craft (U.S. Army, 1976).
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Fig. 2-2. Lethal Areas Around Ground Zero for a Neutron Bomb Exploded at an Alti
tude of 450 Meters.
The innermost circle shows the area of desired military
effect: rapid onset of debilitating radiation illness. The slightly larger
circle shows the area of serious blast damage to civilian structures.
And
the largest circle shows the area in which unshielded persons would receive
large enough radiation doses to cause death from radiation illness within two
months (von Hippel, 1983).

lation density of this area is 200 persons per
square kilometer, with one populated place per
four square kilometers (Arkin et al., 1982).
Ad
ditional targeting difficulties would flow from
the fact that roads naturally pass through these
cities, towns, and villages and therefore so would
many of the military units that would be the tar
gets of battlefield nuclear weapons.
In many
cases, the roads between towns would be crowded
with refugees. Finally, attacking military forces
might use urban and refugee "hugging" tactics so
as to discourage the use of battlefield nuclear
weapons against themselves (Bracken, 1979).
Under
these
circumstances,
and
assuming
short-term fallout effects of the magnitude speci
fied in chapter 5, more than a million civilian
deaths could result from the use of battlefield
nuclear
weapons
at
a militarily
significant
level.
Even a one-kiloton neutron bomb would ex
pose an area of about 5 square kilometers, popu
lated in the Germanies by an average of 1000
people, to radiation doses in the lethal range
(see Fig. 2-2), and it would require more than one
thousand such explosions to immobilize a signifi
cant fraction of the 20,000 tanks that might be
involved in a full-scale battle between NATO and
WTO forces in the Germanies (Arkin et a l ., 1982).
Unfortunately, it is not clear that nuclear
planners understand the horrendous carnage that
would result from the use of even the lowest-yield
nuclear warheads on the battlefield. According to
Paul Bracken (1979), much of U.S. nuclear planning
is based on the results of computerized war games
that predict thousands, not millions, of civilian
fatalities from the use of nuclear weapons on the
battlefield.
He reports that these very low fa
tality numbers are obtained because the computers
are programmed to assume that there are no refu
gees on the roads and to
treat Soviet forces as automata who cross in
to West Germany and advance directly into
[unpopulated] NATO nuclear killing zones.
Here they are detected and destroyed by the
lowest yield nuclear weapon capable of doing
the job.
Command and control difficulties,
confusion, false targeting and other problems
are simply assumed away . . . What actually
prevents either side from getting too close
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to the 4000 towns and cities in Germany is a
collection of Fortran statements (Bracken,
1979).
Preemptive Use of Nuclear Weapons in Europe
Clearly, the consequences for civilian popu
lations of even the use of relatively low-yield
nuclear weapons on the battlefield could be cata
strophic.
And, it is quite possible that, in a
crisis so severe that it resulted in the crossing
of the nuclear threshold, the use of nuclear wea
pons would spread from the front lines.
Indeed,
both superpowers have deployed in Europe mediumand intermediate-range (up to about 5000 km for
the Soviet SS-20 missile) nuclear weapon systems
to back up their short-range battlefield nuclear
systems. There are approximately 2000 warheads on
land- and submarine-based missiles with ranges
greater than 150 km in and around Europe plus
nuclear bombs for an estimated 2500 nuclearcapable fighter-bombers and medium-range bombers.
These warheads range in yield from about one kiloton to more than one megaton (Arkin et a l ., 1982).
These "theater" nuclear weapon systems are
intended to destroy a whole range of targets:
IRBM/MRBM [Intermediate
and Medium Range
Ballistic
Missile]
sites;
naval
bases;
nuclear and chemical storage sites; airbases;
command, control, and communication centers;
headquarters
complexes;
surface-to-air
missile
sites;
munitions
and
petroleum
storage areas and transfer facilities; ground
forces installations; choke points; troop
concentrations;
and
bridges
(U.S.
House
Comm, on For. Affairs
and Sen. For. Rel.
Comm., 1980).
This list corresponds to over one thousand poten
tial targets in the Germanies alone (Arkin et a l .,
1982).
There are, to our knowledge, no official es
timates of the civilian casualties that might re
sult from the use of a significant fraction of
these theater nuclear weapons on their intended
targets.
In order to gauge the possible conse
quences, therefore, an independent calculation was
recently undertaken.
The scenario examined in
volved an attack limited to the nuclear targets in
the above list located in the Germanies (Arkin et
25

al., 1982).
This target set comprised a total of
171 surface-to-surface missile sites, military air
bases and nuclear weapons storage depots (see
Fig. 2-3). It would be natural to give these tar
gets the highest priority since they pose the
greatest destructive threat to the opposing forces
in this region. It was assumed that each would be
targeted by one or two 200-kiloton warheads.
The resulting civilian casualties in the two
Germanies were estimated to range from 1.5-11 mil
lion deaths (7-25 million total casualties).
The
low figures were obtained by assuming that one
200-kiloton warhead exploded at an altitude of 2
kilometers over each target— too high to cause
local fallout.
The high figures were obtained by
assuming attacks with two warheads--one air-burst
and one ground-burst— on each target. This latter
type of attack was assumed for "time urgent" tar
gets such as nuclear air bases by NATO planners in
a recent war-game (Campbell, 1981).
Thus, even the very limited use of theater
nuclear weapons assumed in this scenario against
purely military targets would leave a large frac
tion of the 76 million people living in the two
Germanies dead and injured.
These casualty esti
mates do not include the deaths that would result
from the radioactive fallout carried by the wind
into neighboring countries.
(Fig. 2-4 shows the
projected fallout pattern from the groundbursts
using "typical June winds.")
Nor do they include
longer-term deaths, such as those from radiationinduced cancers, exposure, starvation, and epi
demics .
Once again, the attacks envisioned in this
scenario are very restrained— both in terms of the
types of targets attacked and the small fraction
of the available nuclear arsenal used.
This re
straint does not seem very plausible.
All of the
land-based nuclear delivery systems in Europe are
vulnerable to nuclear attack, and the initiation
of nuclear warfare would result in enormous pres
sures being put on nuclear decision-makers to "use
them or lose them."
Preemptive Strikes at the Intercontinental Level
The leaders of both superpowers have stated
that the use of theater nuclear weapons in a re
gional war would probably result in further esca-
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TARGETS OF PREEMPTIVE ATTACKS

>1

(D NUCLEAR STORAGE SITES

Pig. 2-3. Nuclear Targets in the Germanies.
The
area of each circle is 180 square kilometers
--approximately equal to the area of destruc
tion below a 200 kiloton warhead exploded at
an altitude of 2 kilometers
(Arkin et al.,
1982).
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lation to the use of long-range "strategic" nucle
ar weapons against targets located in the U.S. and
the Soviet Union.
Indeed, a principal argument
for the deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II
missiles in Western Europe is that, since these
weapons can reach deep into the Soviet Union, they
will make it even more difficult to limit nuclear
war to Central Europe.
At the intercontinental level, the highest
priority targets for each side would once again be
the nuclear forces of the other side.
In fact,
much of the history of the nuclear arms race is
that of efforts by each side to make the other
side's nuclear weapon-systems more vulnerable to
attack while trying to decrease the vulnerability
of its own. The MX missile, for example, was ori
ginally intended both to increase the U.S. threat
to Soviet ICBMs and to be less vulnerable than ex
isting U.S. Minuteman missiles to attack by those
same Soviet ICBMs.
As we have seen, almost no official infor
mation has been made available to the public about
the civilian fatalites that could result from the
use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield or
theater levels.
More information has been made
available in the case of intercontinental attacks
against strategic nuclear forces, however, because
of a controversy triggered in 1974 when the Secre
tary of Defense, James Schlesinger, argued that
the U.S. should be better prepared to respond "to
a limited attack on military targets that caused
relatively few civilian casualties" (Schlesinger,
1974).
The idea that a nuclear attack on the U.S.
would not inevitably kill vast numbers of people
was a novel one.
Schlesinger was therefore
questioned in March, 1974, at a Senate Foreign
Relations subcommittee hearing, as to what he
meant by "relatively few civilian casualties." He
replied, "I am talking here about casualties of
15,000, 20,000, 25,000 . . ." (U.S. Sen. For.
Rel. Comm., 1974a).
The Senators were not satis
fied with this answer, however.
Schlesinger was
asked to return and give them a briefing "on the
consequences of the wide ranges of possible anti
military attacks against the U.S." (U.S. Sen.
For. Rel. Comm., 1974b).
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FALLOUT PATTERN FROM
PREEMPTIVE NUCLEAR
ATTACKS WITH 200 kT.
GROUNDBURSTS ON 171
MILITARY TARGETS IN
THE GERMANIES

KILOMETERS
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Fig. 2-4. Fallout from 200-kiloton ground-bursts on
the targets shown in Fig. 2-3, given "typical
June winds".
The black areas are those where
the radiation levels would be lethal to unshel
tered persons.
The shaded areas are those in
which the radiation levels would be high enough
to cause severe radiation illness (Arkin etal.,
1982) .
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When
Secretary
Schlesinger
returned
in
September, he reported estimates that the civilian
casualties
resulting
from
an
all-out
Soviet
"counterforce attacks" against U.S. ICBM silos,
strategic bomber bases, and nuclear navy bases
might total about one million (U.S. Sen. For.
Rel. Comm., 1974b).
The Senators were still not
satisfied, however, and asked the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to set up an
outside review of the assumptions that had been
made in the DOD calculations.
Ultimately, as a
result of the OTA group's criticisms, the DOD ana
lysts revised many of their assumptions with the
result that their fatality estimates rose into the
range of 3-16 million (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm.,
1975) .
Below, we consider separately the DOD's fa
tality estimates for attacks against the three
sets of nuclear targets which were considered:
ICBM silos, strategic bomber bases, and nuclear
naval bases.
We will discuss both the extent to
which they were revised as a result of the expert
panel1s criticisms and the extent to which we find
even the revised estimates to be an inadequate re
presentation of the potential consequences of
these nuclear attacks.
Attacks on ICBM Fields
The bulk of the warheads involved in an at
tack against U.S. strategic nuclear forces would
be thrown against the ICBM force— currently 1000
Minuteman missiles and approximately 50 Titan II
missiles--and
their
associated
launch-control
facilities.
These missiles and launch-control
facilities are distributed across the Great Plains
and Southwestern U.S. in six major and three minor
missile "fields" (see Fig. 2-5).
Since these missile fields are generally lo
cated in relatively sparsely populated areas, the
blast and heat of Soviet warheads exploding over
them would cause relatively few civilian casual
ties.
The missile silos and launch control cen
ters are so hardened, however, that in order to
subject one to sufficient overpressure to destroy
it, a nuclear warhead would have to be exploded at
such a low altitude that the fireball would touch
the ground.
As a result, such dirt and debris
would be sucked up into the fireball, be contami
nated with fission products, and subsequently fall
30

FALLOUT FROM AN ATTACK ON U.S. MISSILE SILOS

ASSUMPTIONS

FATALITIES
C\W\~1 GREATER THAN 50% ,IND00R S ABOVE GROUND

iV.'.YJ GREATER THAN SO%,OUTDOORS

• 2 -O N E MEGATON WARHEADS
ON EACH SILO
• S O % FISSION YIELD

■ MINUTE MAN FELDS

• SURFACE BURSTS

□ TITAN FELDS

• TY P IC A L MARCH WINDS

Fig. 2-5. Predicted fallout pattern, given "typical
March winds" from 2 one-megaton warheads sur
face-burst on each U. S. ICBM silo. Within the
shaded areas the cumulative biological doses of
radiation would rise above the 450 rad average
lethal level— even for people who stayed shel
tered indoors, where the radiation level is
assumed to be one third of that outdoors (U. S.
Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
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to earth as radioactive fallout downwind from the
target.
Most of the fatalities associated with
attacks on U.S. ICBM silos were found to be due to
radiation doses from this fallout.
When Schlesinger first returned to brief the
Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on counter
force attacks, he described an attack on U.S.
ICBM's in which a single one megaton warhead was
exploded at its "optimum height of burst" over
each silo and the resulting fallout was carried
downwind by "typical August winds."
The DOD ana
lysts also assumed that, by the time the fallout
had reached the cities downwind a few hours later,
the residents would have all found places in the
best available below-ground fallout shelters and
that they would have the discipline and supplies
to stay there for about two weeks. With these as
sumptions, the DOD's computers found that an at
tack on U.S. ICBM's would result in about 800,000
fatalities (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1974b).
The review committee found some of these as
sumptions to be optimistic, however, and therefore
suggested that the DOD recalculate its numbers
with different, more realistic assumptions.
Some
of the more important suggestions were the follow
ing (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975):
• Since a single air-burst would not maximize
the probability of destroying a missile
silo, a surface-burst should be assumed as
well.
(A surface-burst would, however, in
crease the intensity of the radioactive
fallout severalfold.);
• The sensitivity of the results to different
wind conditions should be investigated.
(As a result, the DOD analysts found that
the greatest casualties would result with
"typical March [not August] winds".); and
I Less optimistic assumptions should be made
about the use of fallout shelters.
(The
DOD therefore made calculations assuming
that about 45 percent of the population did
not stay in below-ground shelters.)
As a result of these changes, the DOD's casualty
estimates increased by an order of magnitude.
It
was now estimated that the U.S. would suffer as
many as 5 million fatalities from an attack with
two 550 kiloton warheads exploded over each ICBM
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silo (one at the surface and one at "optimum
height-of-burst") and as many as 18 million deaths
if the warhead yields were increased to 3 megatons
(U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
The lower (550 kiloton) yield warheads as
sumed are near the low end of the range (0.5 to
1.0 megatons) ordinarily assumed for the yields of
the multiple warheads on Soviet SS-17, SS-18, and
SS-19 missiles (Tinajero, 1981).
The higher (3
megaton) yield warheads fall outside of this
range, but there is another scenario that would
result in approximately this megatonnage being de
posited on the ICBM fields. This would involve a
one megaton surface-burst on each missile silo and
a 20 megaton surface-burst on the hardened launch
control facility that is associated with each
"flight" of ten Minuteman silos.
It is believed
that in the 1960s, U.S. ICBM launch-control fa
cilities were each targeted with one or two of the
single very heavy (estimated 10-20 megaton yield)
warheads carried by SS-9 missiles (Berman and
Baker, 1982).
The SS-18 missile, which has re
placed the SS-9, has also been flight-tested with
a single heavy warhead, although most are believed
to carry 8-10 lighter warheads (Tinajero, 1981).
Fig. 2-5 shows that, given "typical March
winds," the overlapping fallout patterns from in
dividual missile silos would result in lethal
levels of fallout covering hundreds of thousands
of square kilometers and extending to distances of
greater than one thousand kilometers downwind from
the Minuteman fields.
Cumulative radiation doses
inside intact houses in the shaded areas would ex
ceed 450 rads. The radiation dose-lethality curve
shown in Fig. 2-6 indicates that a 450 rad dose
would result in approximately a 50 percent fatali
ty rate in the exposed population.
Attacks on Nuclear Bomber Bases
A Soviet counterforce attack would also be
expected to target the 19 U.S. Strategic Air Com
mand (SAC) bases that are the permanent bases for
U.S. intercontinental nuclear bombers and the ad
ditional SAC bases that host the tanker aircraft
that would refuel these bombers during their mis
sions or would act as dispersal bases during a
crisis (Berman and Baker, 1982).
Fig. 2-7 shows
the locations of the 46 SAC bases to which these
missions were assigned in 1974 (U.S. Sen. For.
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Fig. 2-6.

RADIATION DOSE (ERD IN RADS)
The approximate probability of radiation illness and death as
a function of accumulated whole-body dose (Arkin et al., 1982).

US STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
OPERATIONAL BOMBER AND TANKER AIR BASES

V"

(1975)

Fig. 2-7.

The locations of U. S. nuclear bomber, tanker, and dispersal
bases as of 1975 (U. S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).

Rel. Comm., 1975; see, also, Air Force Magazine,
1982).
Some of these SAC bases are located quite
close to urban areas.
The blast and heat from
nuclear explosions over these air bases would
therefore result in many more casualties than
would be the case for the relatively isolated mis
sile silos.
Below, we attempt to reproduce the
DOD estimates of civilian fatalities from nuclear
attacks on these air bases and then explore some
of the uncertainties in the assumptions used in
making these estimates.
The DOD Fatality Estimates
In his September 1974 testimony, Secretary of
Defense Schlesinger presented estimates indicating
that 300,000 fatalities would result if a single
one megaton warhead were exploded at an "optimum
height-of-burst" above each of the 46 SAC bases
shown in Fig. 2-7.
The only other information
given was that "August winds" and "maximum utili
zation of existing civil defense facilities" had
been assumed and that "the fatality level is 450
REM's or 7 psi, etc." (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm.,
1974b).
Although Schlesinger’s statement about "fata
lity levels" is rather cryptic, a 450 REM wholebody radiation dose is the level at which approxi
mately one half of the population would contract
fatal radiation sickness.
(See Fig. 2-6.
Rems
may be taken equivalent to rads in this case.) It
is only natural to infer from Schlesinger’s state
ment, therefore, that the DOD used a similar curve
for the blast effects of nuclear explosions with
the 50 percent fatality level being reached at
approximately 7 pounds per square inch (psi)1 peak
overpressure.
This is, in fact, a characterisitic of the
fatality probability versus-overpressure
curve
which can be derived from the curve shown in Fig.
2-8a (Oughterson and Warren, 1956) giving the
probability of death as a function of distance
from ground zero at Hiroshima.
(The low "tail" on
the fatality curve beyond 3 km in Fig. 2-8a pre
sumably reflects an imperfection in the survey
iBecause of its nearly universal usage in the
nuclear-weapons-effects literature, we have not
converted pounds per square inch into metric
units in the text. One psi = 0.0689 Bars.
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used and has been suppressed in our parameter
ization of the curve.)
Fig. 2-8b shows this fa
tality curve replotted as a function of peak
ground-level overpressure.
It has been assumed
that the yield of the Hiroshima bomb was 15 kilotons (Loewe and Mendelsohn, 1982) and that its
height-of-burst was 500 meters (Glasstone and
Dolan, 1977).
Note that the 50 percent fatality
level is indeed reached at approximately 7 psi.
It is virtually certain that the DOD used a curve
such as that in Fig. 2-8b to make its estimates of
the casualties due to the blast and heat effects
of nuclear explosions.
Fig. 2-9 shows the total cumulative popu
lation as a function of distance from the 46 SAC
bases shown in Fig. 2-7 (FEMA, 1983).
It will be
seen that approximately six million people live
within 10 miles of these bases.
Given the re
lationship in Fig. 8b between the probability of
death and peak blast overpressure,
and given
curves for this overpressure as a function of
height-of-burst and distance from ground zero for
a one megaton explosion (Glasstone and Dolan,
1977), one can calculate the total number of fa
talities around the 46 SAC airbuses as a function
of height-of-burst.
The results are shown in
Fig. 2-10. It will be seen that the DOD's 300,000
fatalities correspond to a height-of-burst of
about 5 kilometers.
This height-of-burst is consistent with the
DOD* s subsequent statement that the assumed at
tacks on the SAC bases would result in the "de
struction of any aircraft flying within 2 to 3 nm
[nautical miles] of any of the 46 targets SAC
bases" (U.S.-Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
The
peak overpressure from a one-megaton airburst at
an altitude of 5 kilometers would be approximately
3 psi at a distance of about 3 nautical miles (5.5
km) from ground zero (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
This is approximately the peak overpressure at
which Quanbeck and Wood (1976) state that "large
aircraft of transport types are likely to receive
• . . severe damage."
A 5 kilometer height-of-burst is, however,
approximately 1.5 times the height-of-burst that
would maximize the area on the ground subjected to
a peak overpressure of 3 psi by a one megaton ex
plosion (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
It therefore
37
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2.5

3.1

Fig. 2-8. Fatalities at Hiroshima as a function of:
a) distance from ground zero, b) peak over
pressure and c) time-integrated thermal radia
tion intensity. The original data are shown in
Fig. 2-8a (Oughterson and Warren, 1956) where
the small "x" symbols indicate the total mor
tality rate at different distances from ground
zero, "x-1" the mortality rate due to burns
among people in the open directly exposed
to
the fireball, and "x-2" the mortality rate from
ionizing radiation among people shielded from
the termal radiation.
The dashed curve
in
Fig. 2-8a indicates the total incidence of mor
tality plus severe injury.
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appears that, as with their initial assumptions
about the likely characteristics of a Soviet at
tack on U.S. ICBM silos, the DOD analysts chose a
height-of-burst for the attack on the SAC bases
that would limit civilian fatalities in exchange
for some lessening of the desired military ef
fect.
As Fig. 2-10 shows, if the height-of-burst
had been lowered to approximately 3 kilometers,
where the area subjected to overpressure greater
than 3 psi (and therefore the military effective
ness of the attack) would be maximized, the esti
mated number of deaths would have more than
tripled to about one million.
This is not the
whole story, however. As will be shown below, it
was inappropriate for the DOD to assume that the
level of fatalities resulting from one megaton
airbursts high over U.S. bomber bases would be the
same function of overpressure as the fatalities
that resulted from a 15 kiloton airburst over
Hiroshima.
Heat Effects
In Hiroshima, the heat from the fireball was
intense enough to give most unsheltered people fa
tal skin burns out to distances of 2 kilometers
(Oughterson and Warren, 1956). The amount of heat
energy deposited on an exposed surface facing the
explosion at this distance was about 8 cal/cnr and
the peak blast overpressure was 3.5 psi.
It would take a somewhat greater intensity
from a one megaton airburst (about 11 cal/cm2) to
be as damaging because of the longer duration of
the thermal pulse (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
If
the one megaton explosion occurred at an altitude
of 5 kilometers on a clear day, the thermal radi
ation intensity would exceed this level out to ap
proximately 13 km from ground zero. At this dis
tance, however,
the corresponding peak over
pressure would be only about 1.5 psi— too low
according to the overpressure model shown in
Fig. 8b to cause a significant percentage of
deaths.
It appears, therefore, that in this case
the heat effects of the nuclear explosion must be
explicitly taken into account.
We have therefore fitted the Hiroshima fa
tality data with a family of simple models that
give variable relative weights to the importance
of blast and heat.
(These models still ignore the
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FATALITIES (MILLIONS)
Fig. 2-10. Fatalaties calculated using the curve
in Fig. 2-8b— given a one megaton explosion
over each of the 46 SAC bases— as a function
of the height-of-burst.
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fact that, at distances closer than 1 km to ground
zero at Hiroshima, people not shielded by thick
walls were exposed to lethal doses of gamma radi
ation from the explosion.
Most of these people
would, however, have been killed by blast or burn
effects in any case.
For nuclear explosions of
higher yields, the lethal range of the “prompt"
nuclear radiation emitted by the explosion would
be buried still deeper within the area of lethal
blast and heat effects.)
At one extreme of our family of fatality
models is the "DOD model," corresponding to the
curve in Fig. 8b in which all deaths are assumed
to be due to overpressure (blast) effects.
For
our calculations,
we have
parameterized
this
probability of Death due to overpressure as
PDp = exp[-.69 (7.4/p)1 '4],
where p is the peak overpressure in psi.
At the other extreme, we assume that all the
deaths at Hiroshima were due to heat.
We then
have a parameterization of the curve in Fig. 8c as
the probability of Death due to Heat
PDH = 1 - exp[-.69*(19*f/H)1,3] ,
where H is the heat intensity in cal/cm2.
The
factor f is equal to unity for a nuclear explosion
with the yield of the Hiroshima bomb but must be
increased for greater yields to take into account
the decrease in burn-effectiveness of the thermal
radiation of the associated longer thermal pulse
(Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
Fig. 2-11 shows the fatality levels predicted
by the two extreme models for a one megaton war
head exploded at an altitude of 5 kilometers, as a
function of distance from ground zero. It will be
seen that the thermal effect model would predict a
much higher number of fatalities in this case than
the overpressure model used by the DOD— even
though the parameters of both models are fixed to
predict the same distribution of fatalities for
the yield and height-of-burst of the Hiroshima
weapon.
Between the extreme models, we have a spec
trum of models obtained by taking their weighted
43
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PD = (1 - w)*PDB + w*PDH.
where w, the weighting factor, can take any value
in the range between zero (DOD overpressure model)
and unity (heat model).
Given a one megaton airburst at a height of 5 kilometers above each of
the 46 SAC bases, the corresponding fatality
predictions range from the DOD's value of 300,000
to 1.85 million.
It is unclear what value of w might give the
most “realistic" model. A value of w = .2, corre
sponding
to
a
fatality prediction of
about
600,000, might seem appropriate if one assumed
that 20 percent of the population would be exposed
to direct thermal radiation effects— either out
doors or near windows indoors. Higher values of w
would be appropriate if the heat radiated by the
fireball caused firestorms well beyond the areas
of serious blast effects.
In either case, it
appears that the failure to explicitly consider
heat effects in the DOD fatality model was a major
omission.
Pattern Attacks
In its critique of the original DOD casualty
calculations, the Office of Technology Assess
ment's review group questioned the assumption that
only one nuclear warhead would be used to attack
each SAC bomber and tanker base.
The panel sug
gested that it was more likely that the areas
around each of the bases would be "pattern" at
tacked with a number of warheads in order to try
to destroy in the air as many as possible of the
aircraft that had taken off on warning of attack
(U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
The DOD re
sponded by estimating the number of fatalities
that would result from pattern attacks on the SAC
bases but buried its results in the consequences
of a more comprehensive attack. We have therefore
made our own estimates, using the set of fatality
models described above.
The only indication given by the DOD of the
nature of the pattern attack that it had assumed
is the statement that this attack would cause the
"destruction on any A/C [aircraft] flying within 8
nm [nautical miles] of the 46 target SAC bases"
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(U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
This corre
sponds to an area of aircraft destruction 7-16
times as large as that which had been given for a
single one megaton warhead attack (2-3 nm [3.7-5.6
km] radius).
We have therefore estimated the number of fa
talities that would be caused by a pattern attack
by assuming airbursts of 7-16 one megaton warheads
distributed over a circle of 8 nm (15 km) in a ra
dius around each of the 46 SAC bases. We have al
so simplified our calculation by assuming an aver
age probability of death throughout this circle
equal to the average probability of death through
out this circle equal to the average probability
of death in a circle under a one megaton airburst
with a radius of 3.7 km (16 warhead case) or 5.6
km (7 warhead case). Deaths that would occur out
side the 15 km radius have been neglected.
With
these assumptions and an assumed height-of-burst
of 5 km, we estimate 1.0-1.6 million fatalities
with the DOD's overpressure model (w = 0) and
5.3-6.4 million fatalities with the pure thermal
effects model (w = 1).
Ordinarily, in discussions of counterforce
attacks against the U.S., it is assumed that the
escape time of the bombers and tankers would be
minimized by striking their bases with warheads
launched from submarines located as close as pos
sible to U.S. shores.
In this context, the bar
rage attacks discussed above would appear implaus
ible because the number of one megaton warheads
required (322-736 for 46 SAC bases) is too large
to be delivered by the small number of Soviet bal
listic missile submarines ordinarily on patrol
near the U.S.
Some of the newer Soviet submarine-launched
missiles, however, appear to have multiple war
heads of smaller yield. The SS-N-18, for example,
is believed to be equipped with seven warheads,
each with an estimated yield of 300 kilotons
(Tinajero, 1981). At a height-of-burst of about 2
km, seven 200 kiloton warheads would be able to
cover as large an area with peak-blast over
pressures in excess of 3 psi as the seven one
megaton warheads exploded at 5 kilometers in the
hypothetical pattern attacks discussed above.
In
such a case, only one SS-N-18 missile would be
required for a pattern attack against each of the
46

SAC bases for a total of 46 missiles in all— about
as many as could be carried by three of the Soviet
Union's 13-plus Delta III class submarines (Jane1s
Fighting Ships, 1982-83).
We have therefore estimated the consequences
of a pattern attack with an SS-N-18 missile on
each of the 46 SAC bases and find 1.6 million
deaths using the overpressure model and 0.4 mil
lion using the heat model.
(The prediction of the
overpressure model is higher in this case because
of the lower altitude of burst.)
If one of the
seven warheads were ground-burst for the purpose
of cratering and radioactively contaminating the
runway of each base, there would be an additional
40,000 fatalities from radioactive fallout (assum
ing "typical March winds").
Our conclusion from the above discussion is
that the DOD's original estimates of the civilian
fatalities from a nuclear attack on U.S. bomber
and tanker bases were too low— but by a factor
that is quite uncertain.
Attacks on Nuclear Navy Bases
In peacetime, nearly half -of U.S. ballistic
missile submarines, (and therefore over 2000 U.S.
strategic warheads) are located in four ports:
Groton, Connecticut? Charleston, South Carolina;
King's
Bay,
Georgia?
and
Bangor,
Washington
(Cochran et a l ., 1983).
Other potential counter
force targets would be bases hosting attack sub
marines, aircraft carriers, and other ships carry
ing nuclear weapons that could be used to attack
the Soviet Union or its navy.
There are at least
six such nuclear navy bases in the continental
U.S. in addition to the four bases hosting ballis
tic missile submarines:
Alameda, Long Beach, and
San Diego, California; Mayport, Florida; Newport,
Rhode Island; and Norfolk, Virginia (Cochran et
al., 1983).
(See Fig. 2-12.) Attacks on these
bases would result in substantial numbers of fa
talities in nearby urban areas.
In his 1974 briefing, Schlesinger presented
an estimate of 250,000 fatalities resulting from
an explosion of a one megaton warhead over four of
the above ten naval bases (see Table 2-1).
The
assumed height-of-burst was not given.

47

U.S. NUCLEAR NAVY BASES

S S B N -B A L L IS T IC MISSLE SUBMARINE BASE

Fig. 2-12.

Locations of the major bases in the continental U.S.
out of which nuclear-armed naval ships operate.

Table 2-1

Estimated Civilian Fatalities from One Megaton
Ground-bursts on Ten Nuclear Navy Bases
(in thousands).
DODa

This Work
Blast

Fallout

Total

2
38
30
0

34-260
0- 15
8-195
0

36-260
38- 53
38-225
0

60
—
—
50
90

55
75
8
8
73
51

22-485
72-170
0- 8
4-110
1-105
21-435

77-540
145-245
8- 16
12-115
74-180
72-490

245

340

160-1780

500-2120

Ballistic Missile
Submarine
Bangor, WA
Charleston, SC
Groton, CT
King's Bay, GA

45
—

Other Nuclear
Navy Bases
Alameda, CA
Long Beach, CA
Mayport, FL
Newport, RI
Norfolk, VA
San Diego, CA

Table 1, Notes
aU. S. Sen. For. Rei. Comm., 1974b.
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We have estimated the number of civilian fa
talities— from the blast and fallout— that would
result from an attack on each of the ten conti
nental nuclear navy bases. A fallout program pro
vided by the Federal Emergency Management Admini
stration was adapted for this purpose (Schmidt,
Jr., 1975). A one megaton ground-burst was assum
ed as well as the most pessimistic distribution of
fallout protection factors used in the DOD's cal
culations
(U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm.,
1975).
Several
"typical"
winds— March,
June,
and
August— were used (Defense Communications Agency,
1981), resulting in a range of expected fatalities
due to fallout.
Our results are given in Table
2- 1 .

Total fatalities in the areas surrounding the
ten naval bases were estimated to be 0.5 - 2.1
million.
The contribution due to fallout varied
from less than a third to nearly all of the total,
depending upon the winds.
"Typical March winds"
gave the lowest estimates while "typical August
winds" yielded the highest.
In those cases where
a DOD estimate was made (Charleston, Long Beach,
Norfolk, and San Diego), the DOD figure lies near
the bottom or below the fatality range that we
calculated.
In a 1980 NATO war game designated "Operation
Squareleg" it was assumed that U.S. and British
missile submarine bases in Scotland would be at
tacked with ground-bursts of not one megaton, but
5-megaton warheads (Campbell, 1981). Our prelimi
nary calculations show that the casualties result
ing from a similar attack on the nuclear navy
bases in the U.S. would be several times higher
than in the one megaton case. The total number of
fatalities due to blast alone would rise from 340
to 990 thousand.
Attacks on Nuclear Warning, Communications,
Command, and Defense Facilities
In order to disrupt if not prevent a U.S.
nuclear response, the highest-priority targets of
a Soviet attack on the U.S. strategic nuclear sys
tem would be U.S. early warning systems, the com
mand centers that would issue the orders for U.S.
nuclear weapons use, and the communication systems
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that would transmit these orders.2 Presumably, an
attempt would be made to destroy U.S. strategic
defensive systems as well.
As a result of such
considerations, Berman and Baker (1982) list, in
addition to nuclear delivery systems and their
local launch-control facilities, the following
"nuclear threat targets" for Soviet interconti
nental forces:
• 60 National Command Authority Centers;
• 5 airbases for airborne command posts;
• 60 transmitters for communicating with
ballistic missile submarines;
• 132 radars;
• 28 fighter-interceptor sites; and
• 1 ABM test site.
Ball (1981) suggests that a number of ground
stations
linking
the
strategic
"coramand-andcontrol" network to early warning, navigational,
military communication, and meteorological satel
lites would also be targeted.
We have not yet estimated the casualties from
an attack against the U.S. command-and-control
system.
The numbers are likely to be large be
cause there are hundreds of targets, and many are
located near highly populated areas.
It is al
ready evident from the above discussion, however,
that U.S. deaths from a Soviet nuclear attack on
U.S. strategic nuclear targets alone would probab
ly number in the tens of millions— comparable to
total Soviet losses in World War II— but incurred
in a period of days or weeks instead of years.
Attacks on Cities
In view of the horrendous, albeit unintended
civilian
casualties
which
would
result
from
serious attacks against strategic weapons and
their control systems, retaliation against the
cities of the attacking nation would become quite
credible.
Attacks on Soviet Cities
In 1968, then Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara ordered the DOD to try to quantify the
2These systems are sometimes denoted by the acro
nym C 3I denoting Command,
Control,
Communi
cations, and Intelligence.
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Fig. 2-13.

In 1968, then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara published esti
mates of the percentages of the Soviet population and industrial
capacity that could be destroyed by the U. S. using 100, 200, 400,
800, 1200, and 1600 "equivalent megatons" of nuclear
explosive
power (McNamara, 1968). The above curves are
interpolations of
these numbers made by Kemp (1974).

amount of destruction that the U.S. could inflict
on the cities and industry of the Soviet Union as
a function of the "equivalent megatonnage"3 of
nuclear warheads used.
An interpolation of the
results (McNamara, 1968) gives the curves shown in
Fig. 2-13.
No explanation was given in McNamara's report
about the assumptions used in calculating these
results.
In the case of population, however, a
reasonable guess can be hazarded on the basis of a
comparison of the "assured destruction" curve in
Fig.
2-13,
which
shows
cumulative
Soviet
fatalities as a function of equivalent megatons
used, with the curve in Fig. 2-14, which shows the
cumulative Soviet urban population as a function
of urban land area. One finds from Fig. 2-15 that
the 25 percent of the total Soviet population (50
percent of the urban population) that lives in the
most densely populated urban areas of the Soviet
Union lives on about 1000 square nautical miles
(3500 square kilometers). According to Fig. 2-13,
this many people could be killed by 270 equivalent
megatons.
Dividing the two numbers gives an
"equivalent area of death" of about 13 square
kilometers per equivalent megaton.
This equivalent area of death corresponds to
the area of a circle approximately 2 km in ra
dius. This is the area that could be subjected to
an overpressure greater than 30 psi by an airbust
or about 20 psi for a ground-burst (Glasstone and
Dolan, 1977).
In Hiroshima, however, the equivalent area of
death was approximately equal to the area subject
ed to an overpressure greater than 5 psi (von
Hippel, 1983). If this criterion had been used in
the calculations done for McNamara, the megaton
nages shown along the horizontal axis of Fig. 2-14
would be lower by a factor of 5 for ground-bursts
and up to a factor of 12 for air-bursts.
Thus,
the use of an equivalent area of death scaled from
that at Hiroshima would, for example, lead to a
a
The "equivalent megatonnage" of a nuclear weapon
scales in the same way as the area that it can
subject to more than a given peak blast over
pressures
as the two-thirds power of the mega
tonnage .
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U.S. urban population: 131 million
S.U. urban population: 126 million

Area (thousand NM1)

Fig. 2-14.

Cumulative Soviet and U.S. urban populations as a function of land
area, according to the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
(1978).
One thousand square nautical miles
(NM2) equals 3,420
square kilometers.

12000

PRE-EXCHANGE

POST-EXCHANGE
SOVIET FIRST STRIKE

U.S. FIRST STRIKE

CALCULATED RESULTS OF STRATEGIC COUNTERFORCE EXCHANGES; 1982 FORCES
(BOTH SIDES ON GENERATED ALERT)

Fig. 2-15. Comparison of the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals as of 1982.
The
arsenals are measured here in terms of numbers of warheads (first row)
and equivalent megatonnage
(second row)
as they existed
(left hand
side) and after hypothetical counterforce exchanges initiated by the
USSR (middle) or the U.S. (right hand side). The surviving forces were
estimated assuming that the exchanges occurred after a period of crisis
and that both sides therefore had a greater than usual percentage of
their ballistic missile submarines at sea and bombers on quick-reaction
alert (Feiveson and von Hippel, 1983).

range of estimates of 20-40 equivalent megatons
rather than the approximately 200 equivalent mega
tons that McNamara's DOD calculated would be re
quired to kill 20-25 percent of the Soviet popu
lation.
(The overlapping of circles of death with
each other and with the edges of urban population
areas would reduce the correction factors some
what, but the addition of fallout effects and
secondary effects such as illness and starvation
among the survivors of the direct effects of the
nuclear explosions would increase them.)
Fig. 2-15 shows that in 1983, even after ab
sorbing a first strike, both the U.S. and USSR
would have thousands of equivalent megatons in
their surviving nuclear arsenals.
A comparison
with Fig. 2-14 shows that, even without taking in
to account the conservatism in the calculations
done for McNamara, this explosive power is well
into the "overkill" region for both the cities and
industry of the USSR.
More recent studies have confirmed this con
clusion with more detail.
In one analysis, for
example, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (U.S. ACDA, 1978) estimated that those
U.S. strategic bombers and ballistic missile sub
marines surviving a Soviet first strike could sub
ject 65 to 90 percent of "key Soviet production
capacity"
(primary metals, petroleum products,
electric power generation, etc.) to peak over
pressures in excess of 10 psi. The ACDA estimated
that the same attack would also destory 60 to 80
percent of the remaining, non-targeted Soviet pro
duction capacity by "collateral damage".
The hypothetical U.S. attack in this case was
directed against Soviet "strategic forces, other
military targets, and industry"— not population.
Nevertheless, it was estimated that, if the Soviet
population remained in place, 80-95 million fatal
ities would result.
It was also estimated that
this number of fatalities could be reduced to 2334 million if Soviet cities were evacuated.
The
ACDA pointed out, however, that its assumptions
concerning the effectiveness of evacuation were
extremely optimistic:
80 percent of the urban population evacuates
the cities to range up to 150 km and the
remaining 20 percent take protection in the
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best available
shelters.
The evacuated
people are located with the rural population,
and both the evacuees and rural people go to
the best availale rural shelters and build
hasty shelters . . . This posture represents
an immense civil defense effort and no analy
sis was made to determine the feasibility of
implementing such a posture.
The report adds that, if "residual weapons [were
used] to directly target the evacuated popu
lation," the number of Soviet fatalities could be
increased back up to 54-65 million. None of these
fatality numbers include indirect deaths due to
exposure, starvation, lack of medical attention,
epidemics, etc.
Attacks on U.S. Cities
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Admini
stration (FEMA, 1979) has designated certain areas
of the U.S. as "high risk areas" for civil nuclear
defense planning purposes.
According to this re
port,
Potential target values were developed . . .
based on the following criteria listed in de
scending priority order:
a. U.S. military installations
b. Military supporting industrial,
transportation and logistics facilities.
c . Other basic industries and
facilities which contribute significantly to
the maintenance of the U.S. economy.
d.
Population concentrations of 50,000
or greater . . .
[Then, after taking into account] projections
of Soviet capabilities (circa 1980) . . . en
velopes .were plotted . . .
to depict areas
subject to a 50 percent or greater probabili
ty of receiving blast overpressures of 2 psi
or more.
This hypothetical attack is also discussed
in a report published by Oak Ridge National Labo
ratory (Haaland et.,a 1976).
(See Fig. 2-16.)
There, it is described as being associated with a
specific attack scenario involving a total of 1444
warheads
with
the
following
distribution of
yields:
20 megatons (241), 3 megaton (176), 2
megatons (184), and 1 megaton (843). This appears
to be the approximate distribution of yields which
the Soviet strategic arsenal would have if all
57

Hypothetical Nuclear Attack for Cross Relocation Planning.
Circles Show Areas Covered with 2 psi Or Greater over Pressure from Blast.
Number of Delivered Weapons: 1444.
Total Yield Delivered: 6559 Megatons.

Fig. 2-16. CRP-2B Attack Pattern on the Ü.S. The hypothetical Soviet attack used
by the Federal Emergency Management Administration for civil defense
planning purposes (Haaland et al., 1976). The areas within the circles
would be subjected to peak overpressures in excess of
2 pounds per
square inch.
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Soviet ballistic missiles carried single war
heads.
Since the scenario was devised, many of
these missiles have been replaced with missiles
carrying multiple independently-targetable war
heads.
In terms of both total and equivalent
megatonnage (6560 and 3300 respectively), however,
the attack is still physically possible (see Fig.
2-15) and does, according to FEMA (1979), cover
the highest priority U.S. targets.
Fig. 2-17 shows the estimate in the Oak Ridge
report of the distribution of overpressures to
which the U.S. population would be subject in the
absence of urban evacuation.
Fig. 2-18 shows the
corresponding distribution of radiation doses from
fallout for an unsheltered population with and
without urban evacuation.
It was assumed that 77
percent of the total megatonnage in the attack
would be ground-burst on military and industrial
targets and that the winds would be blowing due
east at 40 kilometers per hour.
The conversion between the "unit-time refer
ence doses" shown in Fig. 2-18 and the peak equivalent residual doses that parameterize the fa
tality curves in Fig. 2-6 involve factors on the
order of unity (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
On
the basis of Fig. 2-17 (in combination with Fig.
2-8b) and/or Fig. 2-18 (in combination with Fig.
2-6) one can therefore conclude that, in the ab
sence of urban evacuation and effective fallout
shelters for the evacuated population, about onehalf of the U.S. population would die in this
hypothetical attack.
This is consistent with the
estimates by the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (U.S. ACDA, 1978) that a comprehensive
Soviet attack on the U.S. would result in 105-131
million U.S. fatalities in the absence of evacu
ation and 69-91 million with urban evacuation.
Once again, fatalities due to starvation, ex
posure, and disease were not estimated.
Conclusions
Most discussions of "limited" nuclear war
focus solely on the political and military costs
and benefits.
Typically, they take little or no
account of the possible consequences for civilian
populations of such uses of nuclear weapons. When
mentioned, these consequences are often dismissed
without any attempt at quantification as the unin-
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Fig. 2-18. Calculated exposure of the U. S.
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and without evacuation of the cities
and towns (Haaland et al., 1976).
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10,000

tended "collateral effects"
purely military targets.

of attacks aimed at

The above discussion shows, however, that for
the types of limited nuclear attacks most fre
quently discussed, the number of unintentional
civilian fatalities would be so huge as to render
meaningless any military benefits achieved by the
attacker.
Furthermore, the infliction of such high
casualties would surely compound other already
enormous pressures to move up the nuclear ladder.
By the time strategic exchanges were occurring,
there would be little remaining distinction be
tween the civilian consequences of an attack di
rected at purely military targets and those of an
attack deliberately aimed at civilians.
It is
also likely, however, that by this time all cen
tral control over the targeting of nuclear weapons
would have been lost in any case [Bracken, 1983].
Clearly the short-term civilian consequences
of the use of nuclear weapons will be an important
factor in the determination of subsequent events
in any future nuclear war.
As such, they should
be taken fully into account along with broader en
vironmental effects by serious nuclear planners
and strategists.
The result is likely to be a
more conservative assessment of the utility of
nuclear weapons and the degree to which we should
rely on them for our security.
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